Speaker：LI Xiong, Associate Professor at University of Science and Technology of China
Time：9:00 a.m., June 23, 2026
Venue：Room 109， Building 12， Wushan Campus
Abstract
This study examines how syndicated loan borrowers adjust disclosure behavior when their lead lenders are distracted by other borrowers in their portfolios. We posit that non-lead loan syndicate participants seek alternative sources of information from borrowers to compensate for reduced monitoring by lead arrangers. Using debt covenant violations of other borrowers in lenders’ portfolios as a proxy for lead arranger “distraction”, we show that borrowers with distracted lead arrangers issue more forward-looking guidance. This effect is more pronounced when syndicate participants possess greater bargaining power, face heightened information needs, or are exposed to higher credit risks, consistent with increased syndicate participant-driven demand for information. We further find that lender distraction is associated with more stringent loan terms in subsequent lending. These results are robust to alternative specification and distraction measures. Overall, our findings offer new insights into the monitoring role of non-lead lenders in the syndicated loan market, a topic previously unexplored in the debt contracting literature.
Biography
LI Xiong, Associate Professor at the School of Management and the School of Technology and Business, University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), and Master's Supervisor. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Hong Kong and was a Visiting Scholar at Washington University in St. Louis. His primary research interests include supply chain finance, information disclosure, and private firms. Currently, he has several working papers under revision at top-tier journals in the fields of finance and accounting.
